SATURDAY: Current Affairs
With Iran being so much on the spotlight right now and having China and Russia just today vetoing the UN Security Council Resolution on Syria, let’s have a look on Sino-Iranian relations and look with more detail at why China put so much pressure to water down resolution 1929 in June 2010.
China – Iran relations: an analysis of the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929
Why did China vote in favor?
On June 9 2010 the U.N. Security Council adopted the resolution 1929 which imposed a ban on sales of heavy weapons to Iran, sanctioned many entities affiliated with its Revolutionary Guard, toughened rules on financial transactions with Iranian banks as well as increased the number of Iranian individuals and companies with asset freezes and travel bans, but did not however mandate sanctions on Iran’s energy by neither imposing economic sanctions nor an oil embargo. This last resolution is the fourth imposing sanctions on Iran since 2006 and it has been adopted by a vote of 12 in favor, Brazil and Turkey against and Lebanon abstaining. On the Security Council, China has exercised its veto only 6 times in 38 years and would not do so lightly, however China’s reluctance to vote in favor of the resolution 1929 as well as China’s efforts to water-down the resolution has been cause of heated debate.
Questions have been raised on what have been the factors pushing the government of China to finally vote in favor of the resolution imposing sanctions on Iran, a country of binding importance for China as it is China’s third-largest crude oil supplier, behind Saudi Arabia and Angola. The obvious explanation for China’s reluctance to accept the sanctions was that China wanted to protect its vital energy links with Iran, but an economic explanation can certainly not be the only reason. While China has never fully accepted Western suspicions that Iran’s nuclear program is not for peaceful purposes and insists that sanctions are not conducive to peaceful solutions, it has to balance its standing between the US who sees Iran as a major threat to its national security interests and Iran, a country which owns 7% of the world’s natural reserves. China definitely does not want to be seen as the cause of Iran becoming the tenth nuclear weapons power in the world, it instead wants to assure that the rise of Iran as a major player, if at all, would be a peaceful one. China has been opposing Western interference in the Iranian domestic affairs and has been favoring a negotiated settlement rather than the imposition of sanctions. Regardless of the geostrategic interests involved, if the Chinese government believes sanctions are going to be counterproductive to the peace-process of the Middle East, it would certainly oppose them. Due to the pressure from the international community, a Chinese veto would have alienated China to the US. Instead, China was able to play a fundamental role in watering-down the sanctions to guarantee their higher degree of success as well as guaranteeing that China’s economic exchange with Iran would remain untouched.
Several Western scholars, John W. Garver among them, believe that China has been playing a dual game by seeking to convince the US that it is a willing and responsible partner in maintaining the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime while at the same time giving Iran the necessary time to succeed in its nuclear plans. The Chinese perspective instead emphasizes that China has been reluctant as well as having pushed for watered-down sanctions mainly because China believes highly selective, limited and tactical sanctions are more effective than ones comprehensive in scale. Zhao Tong explains that as China has been itself a receiver of sanctions, a country’s perception about the utility of economic sanctions will inevitably affect its decision of using sanctions. By guaranteeing what China believes to be the adoption of more effective sanctions, China guarantees that Iran will not rise to become a hostile adversary as well as guaranteeing its trade with one of the most abundant resource-rich country in the world.
In order to clearly understand the reasons leading to China’s decision to vote in favor of the latest resolution regarding Iran, this research will first look into a short background history of the U.N. Security Council resolutions towards Iran. Through an analysis of the historical and economical interdependence between China and Iran, both countries’ perceptions of the impact of the sanctions and resolutions so far imposed on Iran will be then evaluated. The section following would address the main factors which have led to the Chinese government decision. China’s personal experience with sanctions, economic interdependence with Iran as well as pressure from the US, all seem to have contributed to China’s decision to accept the latest resolution. A brief conclusion would summarize the main points mentioned.
History of U.N. Security Council Resolutions against Iran
The most recent measures adopted by the U.N. Security Council have simply complemented the numerous US laws and regulations aimed at slowing Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs as well as curbing its support for the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiites in Iraq and Hamas in Palestine. US pressures against Iran began in the 1980s and heightened in 1996 when a US law, the Iran Sanction Act (ISA), mandated US penalties against foreign companies and individuals found to be investing more than $20million in oil and gas development in Iran.
More serious concerns in regards to a nuclear Iran started in 2002 when an Iranian exiled announced to the world that the Iranian regime had built a much vaster facility for the enrichment of uranium at Natanz. President Ahmadinejad rise to power in August 2005 led to Iran resuming its enrichment work by converting uranium into a gaseous form, the first step in the so-called fuel cycle. To the present day Iran has been able to enrich its uranium to 20 percent of which it has been producing 40 kilograms until today and the sanctions that have been inflicted on its government seem to have had the opposite effect that were meant to have.
The first legally binding resolution on Iran was the U.N. Security Council resolution 1696 adopted on July 31 2006. The main purpose of this first resolution was to warn Iran that sanctions would follow in case of non-compliance. Iran was given a month to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development. Following Iran’s failure to halt its uranium enrichment, on December 23 2006, U.N. Security Council resolution 1737 was adopted, blocking the import and export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment while freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. Following Iran again non complying with the earlier resolutions, the U.N. Security Council resolution 1747 was adopted widening the scope of the earlier resolutions. Iran’s arms export was banned and several more individuals engaged in the country’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities had their assets frozen and restrictions imposed on their travel.
Suspicions regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions were deepened in September 2009 when a second uranium enrichment facility was revealed near the holy city of Qom. In mid-February 2010 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report reaffirmed the Western fears: Iran’s potential for producing a nuclear weapon was confirmed along with evidence of plans for further enrichment and development of a missile-ready warhead. Even though Iran claims that its nuclear program is aimed at diversifying energy sources and accessing reliable energy resources other than fossil fuels, Iran’s non compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions, its failure to report material, facilities and activities as well as failing to provide design informations and access to inspectors, has caused the Western countries to grow more and more suspicions of Iran’s nuclear program.
The latest sanctions under U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 were meant to reinforce the previous sanctions asking for the reestablishment of full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Important to note is that mainly due to pressure from the Chinese government, the latest resolution did not impose sanctions on the Iranian economy. The main objective of the Security Council was to achieve transparency and trust with Iran, before it can be allowed to exercise its rights to peaceful use of nuclear energy under the NPT again. As requested by the Security Council, the IAEA on 15 September 2010 presented a report on whether Iran had or not complied with the last requests. The report once again stated that Iran had not suspended its enrichment related activities and it had not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities. Last month though, Iran had agreed to return to nuclear talks and invited the European Union along with some other world powers, excluding the US, to tour Iran’s nuclear sites on January 15-16 2011, just before the next round of nuclear talks to be held on January 21-22 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey. While the European Union turned down Iran’s invitation, saying that it was the IAEA’s function to inspect the Iranian nuclear facilities, the IAEA ambassadors, along with delegates from Algeria, Cuba, Syria, Oman, Egypt, Venezuela, and the Arab League visited the sites. The visit focused on the domestically-produced deuterated compounds at the Arak heavy water plant and Iran’s achievements in the use of nuclear technology for medical research. While Western countries remain highly suspicious, the Acting Iranian Foreign Minister and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akabar Salehi once again stated that Iran is committed to renounce the production and the use of WMD.
Iran and China’s interdependence and the impact of sanctions
Due to the US imposed economic sanctions since the 1980s, the Iranian oil infrastructure, exploration, refining and downstream production has been deteriorating steadily. Iran’s refining capacity has declined to a point that it has to import some of its gasoline in order to satisfy its domestic need and since more than 80 percent of Iran’s foreign exchange comes from the export of oil and gas, Iran would more and more need to rely on nuclear power as a source of domestic energy. It does seem plausible that Iran’s claim to need nuclear power could be genuine as having nuclear power to provide for its domestic needs would allow the government of Iran to sell most of the production capacity abroad and generate additional income to invest in reconstruction and welfare.
According to the US Energy Administration, Iran is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) second-largest producer and exporter of crude oil after Saudi Arabia. However, even though Iran is said to own 11 percent of the proven global oil reserves and 16 percent of the world’s natural gas resources, which translates into a total of $4000 billion by the current price of oil and gas, due to low technological bases and a population expected to reach 100 million by 2025, Iran’s oil consumption has increased by 8 percent at a time when its production is only 70 percent of its pre-revolution level, leading to Iran expected to become an oil importer in the future. Moreover, as companies such as Total, which provided a third of Iran’s gasoline imports in May 2010, as well as Shell, BP, Reliance, Glencore, Petronas and Lukoil, have all stopped supplying gasoline to Iran, Iran is starting to feel the pressure of sanctions as it is short on refining capacity.
China is instead highly against such an approach towards Iran as this situation could foster deep resentment among the Iranian people as they become indirectly affected by such policies. China believes Iran genuinely needs nuclear technology to deal more effectively with the various problems it is facing, electricity being one of them, and so the Iranian energy sector remains open for the Chinese business. Sanctions on the Iranian economy have resulted in being both unsuccessful in Iran as well as being counterproductive for the American, European and Japanese firms which have been losing a tremendous amount of business from the development of Iran’s oil and natural gas resources. Those firms have lost employment, wages, tax revenues to the Chinese along with Russian and Brazilian firms.
Contrary to Western firms, China offered Iran to rebuild its facilities and engage in joint-venture exploration and development of its new oil and gas fields. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for example, replaced in 2009 France’s Total in a contract to develop a major part of Iran’s South Pars gas field and since April 2010 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Sinopec have been negotiating to replace Eni at Darkhovin.
Chinese companies Chinaoil, Unipec, the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation as well as Zhuhan Zhenrong resumed shipping gasoline to Iran in 2010, even though they had halted their trade in the previous years. In change, Iran has been offering the Chinese companies better terms than foreign investors have traditionally been enjoying, for example in 2007 Iran granted CNPC shorter payback periods and higher rates in return in the 6 billion barrel Azadegan project. To the present date, an estimated 100 Chinese state companies are operating in Iran and many of those companies’ purpose go far beyond Iran’s energy field. China is actually aiding Iran in infrastructure, metros, motorways, ports and airports, dam building, cement plants, steel mills, railways, shipbuilding etc.
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Iran in August 1971, mutual trade has been a characteristic of this relationship. Economic relations between the two have been growing at an annual average of 40 percent over the past few years and the level of trade increased from $400 million in 1994 to $36.5 billion in 2009. Iran and China have been growing increasingly interdependent and in 2009 China surpassed the European Union as Iran’s largest trading partner. While Iran is highly dependent on Chinese goodwill as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China is also becoming more and more reliant on its crude oil imports from Iran. As China’s booming economic growth is expected to continue, the International Energy Agency predicts that China will overtake the US after 2025 as the world’s largest purchaser of imported oil and gas. China’s oil dependence on the overseas market has already crossed the limit of 50 percent and since China is expected to rely on the Middle East for 70 percent of its oil imports by 2015, it is rather clear the important role Iran is going play to maintain the Chinese economy thirst-quenched.
China undoubtedly wants to reinforce its strategic relation with Iran in order to strengthen its presence in Central Asia to reach the energy resources of the Caspian Sea region. Guaranteeing the stability of the Caspian energy would allow China to secure an uninterrupted flow of oil, lessening its dependence on maritime oil imports from the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. However, in order to maintain a stable economic relationship between China and Iran and maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, a destabilized Iran is not in China’s interests. China’s strong stance in opposing restrictions on Iran’s oil exports is not only a result of China’s interdependence with Iran, but also a strong belief that such comprehensive sanctions would be counterproductive by not only hardening the current regime, but also fostering negative sentiments among the Iranian people. While China is not entirely convinced of the Western claims against the Iranian nuclear program, China does stand with Iran in believing that the country has the right to nuclear technology. Nuclear technology would allow Iran to achieve a sustainable development as it is used to generate electricity, diagnose diseases, treat cancer, and sterilize food and medicine, it used in a variety of fields from medicine to agriculture to industry. While Iran has the right to use nuclear technology peacefully under the Article 6 of the NPT, it has also to fulfill its duties under the NPT and comply with the relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Due to Iran’s non compliance with the international regulations, even China has to stand with the Western countries in believing transparency has to be demonstrated in order for Iran to be trusted by the international community.
China’s reasoning behind the acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929
In May 2010 Willem van Kemenade was asking how long would have China been resisting pressure from the US and the European Union before agreeing to the latest resolution against Iran, and not much afterwards the resolution was adopted and assumptions were made on China’s motives towards accepting but watering-down the sanctions. The resolution reflected a compromise between China and the US allies. While China insisted that the new sanctions were neither going to target Iran’s civilian economy nor its population, the resolution allowed those countries that wanted to limit the banking or other corporate relations with Iran to take those measures. China accepted this latest resolution even though its official stance was clearly expressed by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu who stated ‘China always believes that sanctions and pressure should not be an option and will not be conducive to the current diplomatic efforts over the Iranian nuclear issue’. The main reasons leading to China’s decision to accept the resolution could be divided into three different categories: pressure from the US and its allies, geopolitical interests concerning both economic and political security and lastly China’s own unique perspective in regards to the effectiveness of sanctions.
The discourse regarding the effectiveness and implementation of sanctions is one of the main divergences between Chinese and US policy makers. China has often expressed strong opposition to the US manner of constantly imposing sanctions on others, accusing the US of interference in other’s domestic affairs. Part of this divergence is expressed in China often criticizing the ‘Washington Consensus’ imposing conditionalities on the growth of the developing world. The Chinese government instead has been favoring a mutual-beneficial approach towards the developing world whereby by providing an alternative model of development, developing nations trading with China are allowed policy space to maximize the benefits from the relationship. Similarly, China views economic sanctions as a tool that ‘strong, typically Western countries use against weak, typically non-Western countries’ and emphasizes the importance of using peacefully political and diplomatic means in order to resole the Iranian nuclear issue.
For the US, the importance of China for the effective enforcement of Iran’s sanctions is primary. China did not however welcome US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warning of ‘economic insecurity and diplomatic isolation’ if China did not sign on to the new sanctions against Iran. Not much earlier in fact, the Chinese leadership was highly angered by the Obama administration announcing a $6.4 billion arms deal to Taiwan. Not to mention China’s later reaction after Obama met with the Dalai Lama in the White House on February 18, 2010. Those moves by the US were not very well-thought as they could have hindered the prospect for the new sanctions directed to Iran, something the US did not want to happen. The Chinese foreign minister did threaten to suspend military exchanges with the US, impose sanctions on companies selling arms to Taiwan and stated that following US maneuvers, ‘it will be unavoidable that cooperation between China and the US over important international and regional issues will also be affected’. However, it is also true that China needs good ties with the US as much as the US wants China to accept the resolution.
The Chinese oil dependence on the Middle East has made China wary of the US policies towards the resource-rich countries in the developing world. For instance, the US control through the Malacca Strait, through which 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports pass as well as PetroChina, a US subsidiary of CNPC, being listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 2000, presents the potential for the US to threaten China’s energy security lifeline. While China would like the international community to compel Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program by peaceful means, it has also recognized that a stable international environment without creating friction with Washington is most beneficial to China. While Washington had been worried that China might have used its veto to delay the passage of the resolution, gaining more years to Tehran to rush forward its nuclear program, China’s policy towards Iran had instead been taking into consideration both US perceptions towards Iran and Sino-US interactions. It is not in China’s interests to anger the US while maintaining ties with Iran.
There are no doubts that China can achieve greater benefits and energy cooperation with Iran if it does not provoke the US. The US threat of imposing sanctions on Chinese oil imports from Iran is not a rosy scenario for China and it does not want to risk being trapped into such a scenario. The US pressure hence, has definitely played a role in persuading China to accept the sanctions. China’s ability to water-down the sanctions also explains China’s power facing the US and the mutual cooperation on the issue. The fact however that China has not boycotted the four most recent sanctions against Iran is evidence that China does regard Sino-US relations with high priority.
Geostrategic interests are moreover similar to both the US and China and it would be a misinterpretation of the Chinese stance to believe that Iranian nuclearization could fit with China’s geostrategic interests. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran could undermine the peace process between Israel and Palestine as well as leading to stronger ties between the new nuclear power and political factions such as Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and Iraqi Shiites. It is not in China’s interests to witness another war like the one fought to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, a war which would threaten China’s precious economic links with Iran. Such escalations would threaten China’s political security anxiety over issues such as Islamic fundamentalism and separatist movements in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwest China. International terrorism, instability caused by failed states as well as the rise of anti-Chinese regimes are major security threats that China somewhat shares with the US. As China does not want to let the crisis escalate as well as not wanting to punish Iran with heavy sanctions, cooperation with the US has hence become a priority.
Energy security regarding China’s energy imports, investments, foreign trade and various other commercial activities relating to the close ties between China and Iran is of fundamental importance in the discourse regarding China’s decision to accept the sanctions. While it could be speculated that China might have vetoed sanctions that were not watered-down, it would have certainly vetoed a resolution aimed at Iran’s energy sector as such sanctions would have indirectly equaled to sanctions against the Chinese oil industry and economic growth. China would not accept sanctions against Iran’s energy sector even though Iran’s oil industry is considered by the US the engine of Iran’s economy and source of most of its revenue. Sanctions targeting Iran’s energy sector that provides about 80 percent of government revenue would isolate Iran from the international financial system, but would also highly negatively affect China’s oil thirst.
As China’s economy grows, so does its quest for sufficient and secure oil supplies from Iran and other resource-rich countries. China’s dependence on oil imports had been growing along with its booming economy and according to the US Energy Information Administration, China today is the second largest oil consumer in the world behind the US. By occupying a strategic geographical position along the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, Iran has the potential to be an energy hub in the region, securing China with the energy it needs to meet its consumption demand. As portrayed in the earlier section, the links between the Iranian and Chinese economy are exponential and between the years of 2000 and 2008 for instance, China imported nearly 50 percent of it total oil consumption and 12.77 percent was from Iran. As in the end, China was not likely to use its veto, the only power China had during the negotiations for the drafting of the resolution 1929, was to water-down the sanctions in order to guarantee the Iranian oil sector to remain untouched by the U.N. resolution. While the pressure from the US and its allies seems to have been one of the factors persuading China to not use its veto power, energy security and the need for China to secure its oil imports seem to have been one of the main reasons for China pushing for the watering-down of the sanctions.
China’s oil strategy is however not the only reason which could explain the reluctance and watering-down of the resolution 1929 to not incorporate sanctions on the Iranian economy. Chinese scholar Zhao Tong explains that China’s own experience of defending against economic sanctions led it to have a different perception on economic sanctions and depreciate their utility if they are strategic in scope. Zhao Tong analysis of China’s perception and response to sanctions can be easily applied to the case of Iran. His research explains that while China has experienced success with tactical sanctions, which by being highly selective and limited in scale neither targeted China’s security interests nor intended to change its domestic politics, strategic sanctions imposed on China have instead demonstrated to be a failure as by being comprehensive and aimed at delegitimizing, containing and undermining China’s domestic political structure, have triggered harsh responses from China refusing to collaborate at any level with the senders of the sanctions. Mainly due to China’s own experience with sanctions, the government perceives that strategic sanctions targeted at Iran’s energy sector as well as aimed at toppling Ahmadinejad’s regime, would result not only in affecting negatively China’s oil imports but also in devastating effects which could push Iran to further its nuclear program instead of halting it.
The failed strategic economic sanctions imposed on China from 1949 throughout the 1970s and the successful tactical economic sanctions against China’s proliferation actives since 1985 are a clear example of what is meant by Chinese perception on the sanctions’ effectiveness. The strategic sanctions on China during Mao Zedong’s rule had the primary aim to undermine the Chinese political system, with the ultimate aim of weakening the regime at such point that it could topple. Mao’s response to such anti-Chinese sentiments was to implement the so-called ‘anti-imperialist embargo’ policies which not only resulted highly effective and led to a quick economic recovery after the end of the Second World War, but also led to an exponential increase in nationalism among the people of China. The recent tactical economic sanctions following China’s transferring of missile and nuclear-related technology to countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Algeria, were instead largely successful. As those sanctions were not meant to be hostile to the Chinese government in any way but just out of American national security concerns imposed restrictions on specific Chinese companies accused of the transfer of technology, the Chinese government was able to collaborate with the US. China was willing to cooperate mainly because contrary to strategic sanctions, tactical sanctions were not perceived as hostile to the Chinese government and international politics.
Following such history of imposed sanctions, China inevitably has a different perception to sanctions than the Western states have. China therefore is much more likely to impose tactical rather than strategic sanctions as it is aware that strategic sanctions on Iran’s oil sector today would only trigger a stronger regime and rise of nationalism, just like it happened in China during the days of Mao Zedong. A rise of nationalism among the people of Iran against the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council is definitely not a scenario the international community wants to witness, not to mention the impact an irrational Iran would have on China’s Muslim population mainly concentrated in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region causing instability in China’s own territory.
Just like when China threatened the US by imposing sanctions against US firms selling arms to Taiwan after the January 2010 $6.4 billion arms sale, those sanctions were tactical in nature. Instead of interfering with the US domestic affairs and political system, the Chinese government simply tackled the issue at its source by limiting the sanctions to one specific US policy only, hence threatening to sanction only those companies involved, without affecting the people at large. Similarly, China is more and more reluctant to accept sanctions against Iran on a strategic level and while making efforts to avoid comprehensive and strict sanctions against Iran, it succeeded in watering-down the resolution by making the sanctions tactical in nature. China’s own experience with sanctions is hence of primary importance in understanding why the Chinese government was first reluctant to accept the resolution and afterwards pushed for the watering-down of the sanctions.
While many Western scholars typically believe that China’s reluctance to impose economic sanctions on Iran is due to China’s oil strategy in the Middle East, the actual reasons for China to adopt such a stance are much deeper. China’s geostrategic and energy interests as well as the pressure generated from the US and its allies of course do play a significant role in shaping Chinese foreign policy, however China’s own experience with sanctions has been playing a major role in the Chinese government understanding and perception of the success or failure of eventual sanctions.
Accusations against China’s watered-down resolution formulated by scholars such as John W. Garver seem to have little if no foundation. The claim of China playing a “dual game” in both accommodating American and Iranian interests in front of the U.N. Security Council can partly explain Chinese policy towards the most recent resolution 1929. However, by analyzing the Chinese official stance towards Iran, there cannot be found any basis for Garver’s “anti-hegemony” explanation. While it is true that sanctions against the Iranian economy endanger the Chinese uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf, there is no evidence to suggest that China wants to achieve control of the Iranian’s oil as part of a long-term drive for world domination in which there is no space for cooperation with the US. The Chinese government instead, as demonstrated by this research, regards the US as a significant element whose presence is primary to achieving an international community able to peacefully cooperate among all nations.
In order to achieve stability in the Middle East as well as guaranteeing the stability of the Sino-Iranian trade, China has pushed for tactical, instead of strategic economic sanctions by watering-down the latest U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929. The main motive leading China to accept the resolution is perhaps to be related to the US pressure as the use of the Chinese veto would have highly hindered Sino-US relations. However, China’s motives for being reluctant towards the imposition of the sanctions and the consequent watering-down of the resolution have not only to do with China’s geostrategic and economic ties with Iran, but also with China’s own perception of the effectiveness of sanctions. China pushed for sanctions with a more limited scope because it believed strategic comprehensive sanctions were likely to have a highly negative impact on the Iranian economy by affecting the citizens of Iran and causing resentment among them, leading to an even more turbulent regime and an unstable region.
January 16, 2011 by Roberta Cucchiaro
The piece has not been published and cannot be quoted. If interested in obtaining further information or quoting rights please contact the author at roberta.cucchiaro [at] gmail.com
All footnotes have been removed, for the references please find a bibliography below:
Barzegar, Kayhan, 2010. Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian View. Middle East Policy, 17/3, pp. 74-87
Branigan, Tania and Paul Harris, 2010. China fumes at US arms sale to Taiwan, Guardian Online, [internet] 30 January. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/30/ china- reaction-us-arms-sale-taiwan [Accessed 20 December 2010]
Browne, A. and Solomon, J., 2010. China threatens U.S. sanctions over arms sale to Taiwan. The Wall Street Journal, [internet] 31 January. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703389004575034240303883892.html [Accessed 20 December 2010]
Chen, Wensheng, 2010. China’s Oil Strategy: “Going Out” to Iran, Asian Politics & Policy 2/1, pp.39-54
China Daily, 2011 (a). Iran produces 40 kg of 20% enriched uranium. China Daily Online, [internet] 8 January. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-01/08/ content_11813403.htm [Accessed 9 January 2011]
China Daily, 2011 (b). Iran says Istanbul talks to be held late January. China Daily Online, [internet] 11 January. Available at: http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-01/11/ content_11833523.htm [Accessed 11 January 2011]
China Daily, 2011 (c). Iran unveils nuclear achievement. China Daily Online, [internet] 16 January. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-01/16/content_11860159.htm [Accessed 16 January 2011]
Dorraj, Manochehr and Carrie L. Currier, 2008. Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World, Middle East Policy, 15/2, pp. 66-80
Dubowitz, Mark and Laura Grossman, 2010. Report: Iran’s Chinese Energy Partners: Companies Eligible for Investigation Under U.S. Sanctions Law. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Available at: http://www.iranenergyproject.org/iran-chinese-energy-partners.pdf [Accessed 10 December 2010]
El-Masri, Samar, 2010. Iran: Between International Right and Duty, Middle East Policy, 17/3, pp.88-100
Garver, John W., 2011. Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?, The Washington Quarterly, 34/1, pp. 75-88
Global Times, 2010. Decision Time for China on Iran. Global Times Online [internet] 11 February. Available at: http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-02/505215.html [Accessed 30 December 2010]
Gerecht, Reuel Marc and Mark Dubowitz, 2010. To Pressure Iran, Squeeze Russia and China. Wall Street Journal Online, [internet] 14 September. Available through: http:// www.proquest.com/ [accessed 7 January 2011]
IAEA 2010. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 15 September. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-46.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2010]
International Energy Agency, 2009. World Energy Outlook 2009. Available at: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/docs/weo2009/WEO2009_es_english.pdf [Accessed 6 January 2011]
Karimi, Nasser 2011. 4 Jan 2011. Iran to let countries visit nuclear sites, not US. The Washington Post, [internet] 4 January. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2011/01/04/AR2011010400408.html [Accessed 9 January 2011]
Katzman, Kenneth, 2010. Iran Sanctions. Congrssional Research Service report for Congress. December 13. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf [Accessed December 20 2010]
Kemenade, Willem van, 2009. Iran’s Relations with China and the west – Cooperation and Confrontation in Asia. Clingendael: The Hague.
Kemenade, Willem van, 2010. China vs the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions, The Washington Quarterly, 33/3, pp. 99-114
Landler, M., 2010. Despite pressure, China still resists Iran sanctions. The New York Times, [internet] 25 February. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/world/asia/ 26diplo.html [Accessed 20 December 2010]
Liu, Jun and Wu Lei, 2010. Key Issues in China-Iran Relations, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 4/1, pp. 40-57
Ma, Xin, 2008. China’s Energy Strategy in the Middle East, Middle East Economic Survey, 61/23
Mattair, Thomas R., Summer 2010. The United States and Iran: Diplomacy, Sanctions and War. Middle East Policy, 17/2, pp. 52-61
Mu, Xuequan, 2009. Talks on Iran’s nuclear issue: Another round of tough wrangling. Xinhua News, [internet] 27 September. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/27/ content_12118720.htm [Accessed 04 January 2011]
Nicholls, Tom and Simon Crompton, 2010. Iran feels the pressure of sanctions and self-inflicted problems, Petroleum Economist. 77/8, pp. 5-6
Ratner, Ely. 2011. The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China’s Rise, The Washington Quarterly, 34/1, pp. 29-44
Spetalnick, Matt, 2010. Feb 18, 2010 Obama meets Dalai Lama, angering China. Reuters, [internet] 18 February. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1116932520100218 [Accessed 10 January 2011]
Stern, Roger, 2007. The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security, Journal of National Academy of Science, 104/1, pp. 377-382.
Su, Qiang, 2007. Hu, Ahmadinejad discuss Iran nuclear issue. China Daily Online, [internet] 16 August. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/16/content_6028868.htm [Accessed 10 January 2011]
UN SEC C Res 1929, 2010. U.N. Security Council, 6335th Meeting, “Resolution 1929 (2010),” June 9, 2010, Available at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/UNSC_Resolution_1929_6_9_10.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2010]
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010. “Iran,” Country Analysis Briefs, January 2010. Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf [Accessed 6 January 2011]
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010. “China,” Country Analysis Briefs, November 2010. Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/pdf.pdf [Accessed 6 January 2011]
Wang, Suolao, 2010. Persian Gulf Security: A Chinese perspective. Middle East Institute (Occasional Paper), No.10 pp. 1-5
Zhao, Tong, 2010. Sanction experience and sanction behavior: an analysis of Chinese perception and behavior on economic sanctions, Contemporary Politics, 16/3, pp. 263-278.